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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH: THE
POLICY REASONS FOR REJECTING A
PER SE RULE PRECLUDING
SPEECH RIGHTS
Abstract: Public employees do not enjoy the same free speech rights
under the First Amendment as do ordinary citizens. The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently adopted a virtual per se rule precluding free
speech rights for public employees while they are performing ordinary
job duties. This Note argues that such a per se rule both lacks policy
justification and, more importantly, would undermine the purposes of
the First Amendment by impeding academic freedom and permitting
viewpoint discrimination. Rejecting the per se rule best preserves the free
speech rights of public employees and in turn allows them to speak freely
about governmental operations—an especially important function of
public employees, who are firsthand witnesses to government activities.
INTRODUCTION
Although the First Amendment generally protects employees'
free speech rights, the rights of those employed by the government
are more limited.' Courts, most recently the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, have wrestled with how best to define the contours of public
employee free speech rights. 2 In 2004, in Ceballos v. Garcetti, the Ninth
Circuit expressly rejected a per se rule precluding First Amendment
protection for public employees performing regular work duties. 5
 In
doing so, Ceballos sustained the view that public employees do not give
up all free speech protection as a condition of working for the gov-
ernment.4 Furthermore, Ceballos is significant because it relied upon
judicial analyses of free speech in the public employment context,
one of the few areas in which courts limit free speech rights under the
First Amendment. 5
1 See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174-76 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 1395 (2005).
2 Sec id.
3 /d. at 1178.
4 Sec id. at 1174.
6 See id.
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The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances." 6 First Amendment
doctrine, however, limits the general principle that the government
cannot abridge free speech in several ways.? For example, the gov-
ernment may suppress speech if it is directed at inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 8
This formulation is the modern version of the "clear and present
danger" doctrine. 9 Additionally, the government may regulate certain
types of obscenity and indecency." Libelous speech also is usually im-
permissible under the First Amendment." Finally, the government
possesses limited ability to restrict speech by its employees. 12
An inherent tension exists between government employers' need
to manage the workplace and the operation of the First Amendment
in preventing governmental infringement of free speech." Courts
have struggled with the balance of public employees' free speech
rights and government interests for over a hundred years, always rec-
ognizing, on the one hand, that full operation of First Amendment
free speech in public workplaces would allow impermissible work-
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7 See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
8 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (enunciating the test that the gov-
ernment may suppress speech only if it is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action).
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (holding that the defendants vio-
lated federal statutes by interfering with military recuitment during wartime and that the
speech lacked First Amendment protection because it posed a clear and present danger to
national security). Schenck 14 United States set out the original clear and present danger test.
Id, Brandenburg. v. Ohio is the modern precedent on the issue. See 395 U.S. at 447.
'° See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that child pornography
receives no First Amendment protection so long as the applicable statute banning child
pornography explicitly restricts only works that visually portray children in a sexually ex-
plicit manner); Miller v California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (formulating a three-factor test
to determine if sexually explicit material is obscene).
See N.Y Times v Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (holding that in order to comply
with First Amendment freedoms, public officials alleging libel must prove actual malice to
recover).
19 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding that to receive First
Amendment protection, a public employee's interest in speaking must outweigh the public
employer's interest in preventing workplace disruption).
19 See id.
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place disruption." On the other hand, public employees are in a
unique position to uncover improprieties within the government due
to their firsthand knowledge of governmental operations, and there-
fore, the First Amendment's guarantee of a right to petition the gov-
ernment for redress of grievances is an essential right to preserve for
public employees. 15
U.S. courts offered little protection for public employees' free
speech rights before 1968. 18 For example, in 1892, in McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts re-
jected the right of public employees to criticize their employers and
maintain their employment. 17 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is often
quoted for the introductory remark to his opinion in that case: "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman." 18 Accordingly, government
employees were forced to give up constitutional free speech rights as a
condition of public employment.°
Courts today provide some First Amendment protection to public
employees. 20 Although public employees do not enjoy the same free
speech rights at work as ordinary citizens, certain protections are af-
forded. 21 Whether public employees' speech is constitutionally pro-
tected is determined using several judicial tests. 22 In 2000, in Urofsky v.
Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that if a public
employee is performing regular workplace duties and thus acting as a
representative of the state, the employee's speech should not receive
First Amendment protection. 23 Such a per se rule would create a new
type of analysis for when a public employee speaks while performing
job duties.24 Although the Fourth Circuit justifies its approach by rea-
" See, e.g., Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp, 964, 966 (D.D.C. 1949); McAuliffe v. Mayor
of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892); Reagan v. Bichsel, 284 S.W.2d 935, 937
(Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
is See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1175.
16 See Washington, 84 F. Supp. at 966; McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517; Reagan, 284 S.W.2d at
937; sec also Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination Under the First Amendment:
the Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 530 (1998) (describing
the history of public employee free speech jurisprudence).
17 29 N.E. at 517.
18 Id.
ID See id.; sec also Washington, 84 F. Supp. at 966; McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517.
2° See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 32-54 and accompanying text.
22
 See, e.g., Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174-76; Urofsky v. Gilmore. 216 F.3d 401, 409 (4th Cir.
2000).
25 2 1 6 F.3d at 409.
24 See id. at 407.
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soning from current caselaw, such an approach potentially could eradi-
cate the use of the current judicial public employee speech tests. 25
This Note argues that courts must reject the per se rule preclud-
ing First Amendment protection for public employees' speech made
while performing regular employment duties. 26 Part I of this Note ex-
plains the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of public
employees' free speech rights and discusses the relevance of whistle-
blower statutes." Part II discusses the concept of a per se rule prevent-
ing public employees from claiming First Amendment protection for
speech in their regular employment ditties." Part III discusses Cebal-
los, in which the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected a per se rule." This
Part also discusses the status of the per se rule in other circuits and
the common policy objections to the per se rule." Finally, Part IV ar-
gues that the purposes of the First Amendment will be undermined
unless public employees possess freedom of speech while performing
regular employment duties.si
THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
A. Two-Tiered Analysis: The Pickering Balancing Test and
the Connick Public Concern Test
The modern approach to public employees' speech doctrine be-
gan in the 1960s when the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of
public employees' free speech rights." In 1968, in Picketing v. Board of
Education, the Court articulated a new balancing test to determine
whether a public employee's speech is constitutionally protected." The
plaintiff, a public school teacher, lost his job for writing a letter to a lo-
cal newspaper alleging irresponsible spending by the school district on
sports programs.54 The Court determined that the Board of Education
had violated the plaintiffs First Amendment right to free speech. 55 Us-
28
 Sec id.
25 See infra notes 160-245 and accompanying text.
77 See infra notes 32-69 and accompanying text.
2s See infra notes 70-105 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 106-59 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 122-59 and accompanying text.
as See infra notes 160-245 and accompanying text.
82 See Pickering v Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S, 563,568 (1968); Rosenthal, supra note 16, at
533.
" 391 U.S. at 568.
a4 Id. at 564.
aa Id. at 565.
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ing a formula now referred to as the Picketing balancing test, the Court
held that for a statement by a public employee to receive First Amend-
ment protection, the employee's interest "as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern," must outweigh "the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees."36 Because teachers are likely to
have informed opinions on the operation of schools, the Court rea-
soned that teachers should be able to speak about how their area of
government should allocate funds." Furthermore, the Court con-
cluded that even though some of the plaintiffs statements were false,
those statements nevertheless constituted protected speech because
they were not knowingly or recklessly false."
The Pickering balancing test is still used in public employee free
speech cases, supplemented by an additional preliminary analysis that
the Court later added to this test," In 1983, in Connick v. Myers, the
U.S. Supreme Court sought to clarify its holding in Pickering. 4° The
Connick Court held that as a threshold issue of law, before applying
the Pickering test, courts must determine whether the public employee
speech at issue touched matters of public concern. 41 In Connick, the
Court held that a public employee did not have a free speech right to
prepare a questionnaire for her coworkers where the complaints at
issue—including transfer policies, office morale, pressure to vote for
certain political parties, and the need for a grievance committee in
her government office—were primarily personal grievances, not mat-
ters of public concern.42 The Court reiterated the importance of en-
suring that citizens retain fundamental rights while working for the
government." The Court indicated that the essential inquiry under
Connick is to determine whether an analysis of a public employee's
speech can proceed to the Pickering test, which depends upon whether
the employee spoke "as a citizen upon matters of public concern,"
56 Id. at 568.
37 Id. at 572.
" Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572.
59 See Connick v Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 535.
49 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 141-42. The Supreme Court stated that the district court and court of appeals
had misapplied the Pickering balancing test. Id. at 142. The statement at issue, however,
only minimally touched upon matters of public concern. Id. at 154.
43 Id. at 147.
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rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal in terest." 44
Courts now utilize the "public concern" test. 45
Connick provides several guiding statements regarding the opera-
tion of the Pickering balancing test. 46 The Connick Court stated that
when employee expression does not relate to a matter of political, so-
cial, or other concern to the community, the government can manage
its offices—and employee speech—as it sees fit without worry of judi-
cial intervention.47 When a public employee speaks on a matter of
public concern, however, the speech is of sufficient importance to re-
ceive protection in federal courts. 48
The Connick Court decided that determining what constitutes a
matter of public concern is a question of law, and courts must analyze
the "content, form, and context" of the allegedly protected speech in
making this determination. 49 Because the Court has restricted pro-
tected speech to that addressing matters of public concern, not every
statement made in a government office, particularly those regarding
workplace grievances that have no societal importance, is subject to
constitutional scrutiny." The more an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern, however, the greater a showing of workplace
disruption is necessary to disallow First Amendment protection under
the Pickering balancing test. 5 i The Court nevertheless gives great defer-
ence to employers and allows preventive measures to disruption when
necessary." Thus, as a result of Pickering and Connick, a trial court pre-
sented with a public employee's free speech claim first must consider
whether a public employee's statement touches on a matter of public
concern, and then the court must weigh the interests of the govern-
ment, including preventing workplace disruption, against the em-
44 Id.
45 E.g., Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2003); Baldassare v. New jersey,
250 F.3c1 . 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2001); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.
1998); Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996).
46 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138-54 (citing Pickering for the proposition that a statement
by a public employee receives First Amendment protection only if the employee's interest
"as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern," outweighs "the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees").
47
 Id. at 146.
443 Id.
42 Id. at 147.
50 Id. at 149.
5' Connick, 461 U.S. at 152.
52 See id.
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ployee's interest in the speech." Courts now use the threshold Connick
public concern test and the Pickering balancing test to analyze all public
employee free speech cases."
B. Additional U.S. Supreme Court Commentary
on Public Employees' Free Speech Rights
In the years following Connick and Pickering, the Supreme Court
clarified the operation of the two tests." For example, in 1987, in
Rankin v. McPherson, the Court held that public employee speech
need not directly relate to one's employment to receive First Amend-
ment protection. 58 In that case, the defendant, a constable, termi-
nated the plaintiff, a law enforcement official, when the plaintiff re-
marked that she hoped assassins would successfully shoot President
Ronald Reagan the next time they tried.57 The Court held that the
plaintiff's statements were of public concern under Connick, and that
the employee's interest in speaking outweighed the employer's inter-
est in forbidding it under the Pickering balancing test; therefore, the
speech received First Amendment protection.58 The Court reasoned
that the plaintiffs statement did not disrupt the work environment,
and that because it did not make her unsuitable to perform her work,
no governmental interest existed to balance against the employee's
free speech interest under the Pickering test."
Furthermore, the Supreme Court also has restrained government
employers' right to terminate employees immediately for criticizing
the government." In 1996, in Waters v. Churchill, the Court held that a
government employer must conduct a reasonable inquiry into an al-
leged unprotected statement before taking any adverse employment
action because of it. 81 In Waters, the Court decided that a public hospi-
tal nurse's interest in criticizing a hospital policy that she thought ad-
versely affected patient care was of public concern under Connick and
sufficiently outweighed the government employer's interest in an
53 See id. at 146; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
54 See, e.g., Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 596; Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 197; Dill, 155 F.3d at 1201;
Fikes, 79 F.3d at 1084.
55 See gorerally Rankin v McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
56 Id. at 389.
57 Id. at 379-80.
59 Id. at 388-89.
59 Id. at 388.
e0 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,671 (1996).
61 Id. at 677.
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efficient workplace under Pickering.62 This holding grants some pro-
tection for whistleblowers because it means they do not risk immedi-
ate termination after reporting wrongdoing, though the Court sug-
gested that additional procedural protections could be given through
whistleblower statutes. 63
C. Additional Category of Free Speech Protection: The Whistleblower Statutes
In addition to the protection accorded to public employees' free
speech rights under Pickering and Connick, whistleblower statutes also
protect federal employees." The major law protecting federal em-
ployees' speech rights is the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989. 65
The Act provides that federal employees who reveal particular prohib-
ited personnel practices and experience some adverse personnel ac-
tion as a result may seek redress from a Merit Systems Protection
Board.66 If the public employee can show both that the official taking
the personnel action knew of the disclosure and that the personnel
action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person
could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the
personnel action, the employee is entitled to corrective action. 67 Em-
ployee revelations protected by the Act include violations of any law,
rule, or regulation; gross mismanagement; a gross waste of funds; an
abuse of authority; or a substantial and specific danger to public safety
or health. 68 Though whistleblower legislation is sometimes criticized
as under-inclusive, it does exist as an additional protection for public
employees' free speech rights. 69
62 Id. at 675, 677. The Waters Court further held that a trial court should decide
whether speech is of public concern based upon what content the employer reasonably
believed the speech contained, not what content the factfinder determines the speech
contained. Id. at 677.
66 Id. at 674.
64 See Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1222 (2000).
65 See id.
66 See § 1221(e) (1).
62 See id.
66 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8) (A) (2000).
e® See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
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II. THE MOVE TOWARD A PER SE RULE AGAINST FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
WITHIN A PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' JOB DUTIES
A. The Distinction. Between Private Citizens and Public Employees
in the Connick Public Concern Test
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided a case in which a
public employee's speech is part of that employee's fulfillment of an
employment duty.70 Rather, the Court's cases have dealt only with ex-
traneous comments made by employees during work, not speech
made in memoranda or reports the employee is required to write to
fulfill ordinary employment duties while acting on behalf of the gov-
ernment. 71 Whether this type of speech receives First Amendment
protection remains uncertain because the federal circuit courts of ap-
peals are divided on the issue."
This uncertainty regarding whether public employee speech
made while carrying out one's employment duties receives constitu-
tional protection may depend upon the interpretation of language in
Connick v. Myers." Convick' s public concern test distinguishes pro-
tected speech based on whether a public employee speaks "as a citizen
upon matters of public concern" or as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest." 74 A public employee speaking as a citizen
on matters of public concern is constitutionally protected, but an em-
ployee speaking on matters of private concern receives no First
Amendment protection. 75 Consequently, two questions arise: If the
public employee is speaking on a matter of public concern, can the
employee still speak as a citizen within the meaning of Connick when
performing employment duties in the role as employee—for exam-
ple, while writing reports or speaking publicly as a representative of
the government? 76 Moreover, has Connick set up a test in which courts
must determine separately whether the subject matter touches public
concern and whether the employee was speaking as an employee or as
70 See generally Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. lid. of Educ., 391
U.S. 563 (1968).
71 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 138-54; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563-75.
71 Compare Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168,1178 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.
Ct. 1395 (2005) (holding that no per se rule exists), with Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,
409 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that public employees enjoy no free speech rights while
speaking in their employee roles).
73 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409.
74 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
75 Id.
76 See supra notes 70-75; infra notes 78-159 and accompanying text.
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a citizen?" The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals favors a per se rule
precluding First Amendment protection for public employees per-
forming their job tasks ("the per se rule") and considers the Connick
language to create an essential distinction, while the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejects the per se rule and interprets the Connick
language more loosely." These opposing views are discussed below."
B. Urofsky v. Gilmore: The Fourth Circuit Moves Toward a Per Se Rule
The Fourth Circuit has adopted a virtual per se rule precluding
free speech rights for public employees. 80 In 2000, in Urofsky v. Gil-
more, the Fourth Circuit held that in determining whether public em-
ployee speech receives First Amendment protection, a court first must
consider whether the employee spoke as a private citizen or as a pub-
lic employee; only after this consideration can a court determine
whether the speech was of public concern under Connick and then
move on to perform the Pickering v. Board of Education balancing test. 81
The Urofsky court adopted this virtual per se rule in the context of a
case where professors at public colleges and universities brought suit
to challenge the constitutionality of a Virginia statute restricting state
employees' access to sexually explicit material on computers owned or
leased by the state. 82 The court decided the case using the framework
of the Pickering and Connick tests and determined that state employees
receive no constitutional protection while accessing sexually explicit
materials on state-owned computers.°
In applying the Connick public concern test, however, the Urofsky
court interpreted the U.S. Supreme Court's enunciated test—whether
the employee spoke "as a citizen upon matters of public concern,"
rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal interest"—
as emphasizing the unrelatedness of the unprotected speech at issue
to the public employee's work duties. 84 To demonstrate this distinc-
tion, the court used the example that if a district attorney must make
a public statement regarding an upcoming murder trial, the attorney
77 See supra notes 70-75; infra notes 78-159 and accompanying text.
78
 Compare Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1178 (rejecting a per se rule), with Urofsky, 216 F.3d at
409 (essentially adopting a per se rule).
79 See infra notes 80-159 and accompanying text.
13° See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409.
8t
 Id. at 407.
82 Id. at 404.
8° Id.
84 Id. at 407 (citing the Connick public concern test).
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has no constitutional free speech right to disregard a supervisor's in-
structions about the speech because the speech is a requirement of
the attorney's employment, even though the content of that speech
may be of great public concern. 83 The attorney could, however, write a
letter to a newspaper alleging prosecutorial malfeasance—meaning
the attorney would be acting as a citizen—and receive First Amend-
ment protection.88 In drawing this distinction, the court explained
that employment duties will often involve speaking on matters of con-
cern to the public and that using the First Amendment to give em-
ployees the right to dictate how they perform those work duties—
simply because the speech involves a matter of public concern—
would be irrational. 87
Urofsky does not establish a firm per se rule, but if it is applied
stringently, public employees speaking in their roles as employees
have no free speech rights. 88 The Urofsky court asserted that when
speech is not made in a public employee's capacity as a private citizen
and regarding matters of public concern, no First Amendment pro-
tection exists. 89 Although the court did not expressly state that a pub-
lic employee never has a free speech right while performing employ-
ment duties, Urofksy's holding made the role of the speaker dispositive
in the public concern analysis under Connick." Consequently, Urofsky
requires a new two-tiered inquiry when an employee speaks in
fulfillment of an employment duty.91 A court must consider first
whether the employee spoke as a citizen or as an employee and then
consider whether the subject matter was of public concern. 92
C. Policy Support for the Per Se Rule
Urofsky highlights multiple policy concerns that underlie the idea
of adopting a per se rule, and its viewpoint has also proven influential
with other judges.93 First, public employees speak for the state. 94 Sec-
ond, providing such speech rights would be inconsistent with whistle-
28 Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 407-08.
86 Id. at 407.
87 Id. at 407-08.
ag See id. at 409.
89 See id.
13° See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 409.
DI Ste id.
92 Id.
93 Sec id.; see also Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1189 (O'Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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blower statutes. 95 Third, the rule would constitutionalize the perform-
ance of everyday work duties. 96
The first major policy supporting a per se rule is that when public
employees act within the scope of their employment, they speak not
for themselves but for the state. 97 As a result, the employee's role re-
quires regulation because observers could construe statements as
official government stances on any given issue, regardless of whether
the statements address matters of public concern." No personal in-
terest in the speech exists, and consequently, no First Amendment
right should attach. 99
Second, according to the Urofsky viewpoint, legislatures enacted
whistleblower statutes solely because such legislation creates a right
where no constitutional protection otherwise exists.'" In supporting
the Urofsky court view in his special concurrence to the 2004 Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision in Ceballos u Garcetti, Judge O'Scannlain
noted that whistleblower statutes became necessary because the First
Amendment did not otherwise protect public employees who revealed
governmental misdeeds. 191 Consequently, legislatures passed laws to
protect this speech because it had value but remained constitutionally
unrecognized.'"
Finally, the Urofsky court reasoned that without a per se rule, a con-
stitutional claim could arise in every action a public employee per-
forms.'" Out of their fear of lawsuits, government employers could be
forced to tolerate mere workplace grievances or unprofessional lan-
guage and to avoid making rules and taking disciplinary action. 104 Be-
cause of public employees' status as representatives of the government,
the existence of whistleblower statutes, and the fear of constitutionaliz-
ing everyday work duties, some reason that a per se rule against consti-
tutional protection for public employee speech is necessary.'"
96 See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
97 See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1189 (O'Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
" See id. Judge O'Scannlain argued that performance of a public employment task is
state action, and therefore, that speech contained within an employment task bears the




 See id. at 1192.
wi See id,
In See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1192 (O'Scanniain, J., specially concurring).
1° 3 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 408.
104 See id. at 409.
106 See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
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III. THE REJECTION OF THE PER SE RULE
A. Rejecting Urofsky: Ceballos v. Garcetti
Although some courts maintain the necessity of a per se rule pre-
cluding free speech rights for public employees performing job du-
ties, others take the position that some constitutional protection for
public employees at work necessarily must exist.m° In 2004, in Ceballos
v. Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected the
per se rule. 107 In Ceballos, the plaintiff, a deputy district attorney, was
instructed by his superiors to investigate the possibility that a deputy
sheriff lied in a search warrant affidavit. 108 The plaintiff sent a memo-
randum to the head deputy district attorney, who informed the plain-
tiff that he should revise the memorandum to make it less accusatory
of the sheriff. 1 °9 While a hearing on a motion challenging the search
warrant was pending, the plaintiff informed opposing counsel that he
believed the affidavit contained false statements and that he felt the
law compelled him to turn over his memorandum to opposing coun-
sel." 0 The plaintiffs superiors then instructed him to amend the
memorandum to include the statements of only one detective, and as
a result, the plaintiff was prevented from telling the court some of his
conclusions."'
The plaintiff was then demoted, treated in a hostile manner, and
denied a promotion for criticizing , the deputy sheriff too harshly." 2 He
filed a complaint against his employer alleging a violation of his First
Amendment rights." 3 The district court dismissed the complaint
against the government on Eleventh Amendment grounds and against
individual defendants on the grounds of qualified irnmunity." 4
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed as to the individual defen-
dants, holding that public employees can have free speech rights
while carrying out employment duties. 15 The plaintiffs employers
1011 See infra notes 107-59 and accompanying text.
107 361 F.3d 1168, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005).




112 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1171-72.
115 Id. at 1172.
114 a
115 Id. at 1178. In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit discussed only the dismissal based on
qualified immunity of individual public officials. Id. at 1170. The court held that qualified
immunity does not apply where a public official has violated a clearly established constitu-
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contended that even though exposing a sheriff's false testimony un-
doubtedly addresses a matter of public concern, the memorandum
that the plaintiff prepared was unprotected speech because he pre-
pared it in fulfillment of an employment responsibility." 9 Under the
employers' conception of the Connick v. Myers public concern test, the
plaintiff had acted as an employee and not as a citizen; therefore, they
argued, the speech should not receive constitutional protection." 7
The court ultimately rejected this argument, reasoning that pub-
lic employees are in a unique position to contribute to the debate on
matters of public concern, and that depriving them of free speech
protection when carrying out their employment duties could under-
mine the maintenance of governmental integrity."g Additionally, the
court stated that a per se rule would negatively affect whistleblowers
because public employees have a duty to notify their supervisors of
wrongdoings." 9 Moreover, the court noted that if a distinction is
made between whether the employee acted as a citizen or as an em-
ployee, a public employee could receive protection for reporting
some operation of the government to the press but not to supervisors
who might be able to remedy the situation, 120 Ceballos thus expressly
criticized the Fourth Circuit's decision in Urofsky v. Gilmore and then
rejected a per se rule. 121
B. Other Federal Courts of Appeals Expressly or Impliedly
Rejecting a Per Se Rule
Like the Ninth Circuit in Ceballos, most circuits have either im-
pliedly or expressly rejected the per se rule. 122 In 2001, in Baldassarre
v. New Jersey, the Third Circuit expressly rejected a per se rule.'" In
that case, a prosecutor's office demoted and later fired an investigator
tional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. In determining whether
such a constitutional right existed, the court considered Ceballos's free speech rights un-
der the First Amendment. Id.
118 Id. at 1174.
717
 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
118 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1175.
119 Id. at 1176.
120 Id.
"I Id. at 1177 n.7; see Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 409 (4th Cir. 2000).
"2 See, e.g., Rodgers v Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2003); Baldassare v. New
Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir.
1999); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (10th Cir. 1998); Fikes v. City of
Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996).
1" 250 F.3d at 196-97 (holding that a public employee can state a claim for violation
of free speech rights while performing work duties).
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after he conducted a routine investigation into an automotive scam
implicating other investigators. 124 In rejecting the argument of the
prosecutor's office that statements made in the course of carrying out
employment duties received no constitutional protection, the court
noted that the speech condemning the other investigators fit squarely
into Connick's public concern test, which emphasized the importance
of bringing to light breaches of the public trust. 125
Similarly, in 2003, in Rodgers v. Rallies, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an employee could engage in protected speech as a
citizen while performing employment duties. 126 The court expressly
rejected the district court's finding that a letter written by the plaintiff
could not pass the Connick public concern test because it was written
in her capacity as an employee and not in her role as a citizen.'" In-
stead, the court explained that the Connick analysis requires a deter-
mination whether an employee was "speaking as a citizen (albeit in the
employee role) [rather than] speaking as an employee for personal in.-
terest."128 Rodgers decided that a proper focus under Connick is on the
purpose of the speech as opposed to the role of the speaker in saying
it. 129 Again, a circuit court rejected the adoption of a per se rule.'"
Several other circuits have impliedly rejected a per se rule."' For
example, in 1999, in Lewis v. Cowen., the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a state lottery worker's refusal to propose certain
changes to the game was a matter of public concern, but that the
state's interest in efficiency outweighed the employee's personal in-
terest in the speech. 132 By allowing the loltery worker's speech made
within his official capacity to pass the threshold Connick public con-
cern test, the Second Circuit impliedly accepted the idea that public
employees have protected speech rights within the scope of their em-
ployment duties. in
Similarly, in 1998, in Dill v. City of Edmond, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that a pOlice officer's statement that he be-
lieved certain determinations about the facts of a homicide investiga-
124 Id, at 200.
125 Id. at 196-97; see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
126 344 F.3d at 598-99.
127 Id. at 598.
128 Id. at 599.
129
134 See id.
111 See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
132 165 F.3d at 164-65.
193 See id.
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Lion to be untrue was a matter of public concern even though the in-
vestigation was a part of his employment duties.' 34 Likewise, in 1996,
in Fikes v. City of Daphne, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals also
held that a police officer's statements regarding improprieties within
the department touched on matters of public concern, regardless of
the fact that the statements were made in the course of the officer's
duties. 135 By acknowledging that these employees had constitutionally
protected rights in carrying out employment tasks, these circuit courts
impliedly rejected the per se rule. 136
C. Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Using Other Approaches to a Per Se Rule
Unlike federal appeals courts that have expressly or impliedly
rejected the per se rule, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowl-
edges a public-private distinction in determining whether public em-
ployee speech reaches matters of public concern under Cottnick. 137 Yet
in 2000 in Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Board of Control, the
Fifth Circuit held that even when a speaker has mixed motives in his
or her role as a speaker, a statement still can pass the Connick public
concern test.'" Therefore, in Kennedy, where a library worker sug-
gested a new security policy in response to a rape on the premises, the
court held the speech was still protected because the employee was
speaking as both an employee and a citizen. 139
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also has adopted a unique
approach to the proposed per se rule. 140 In 2001, in Gonzalez v. City of
Chicago, the court held that employees' routine reports were not of
public concern under Connick because they formed part of a constant
duty to fill out paperwork."' In 2002, in Delgado v. Jones, however, the
court narrowed the holding of Gonzalez to address only the most rou-
tine work tasks, where no evidence of public motivation exists. 142 In
Delgado, this meant a police officer's reports detailing impropriety
1 " 155 F.3d at 1202-03.
135
 79 F.3d at 1084.
136 See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
137 See Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 366 (5th
Cir. 2000) (holding that a free speech right can exist where a public employee speaks both
as a citizen and as an employee on matters of public concern while performing job tasks).
"8 Id.
136 Id. at 376.
14{) See, e.g., Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 517-19 (7th Cir. 2002).
141 Gonzales v. City of Chi., 239 F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001).
142 Delgado, 282 F.3d at 519.
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within the department were protected. 193 The court explained that
"Gonzalez is limited to routine discharge of assigned functions, where
there is no suggestion of public motivation." Although the Delgado
court expressly stated that it rejected a per se rule against speech
rights in the course of employment duties, the Gonzalez precedent still
creates a per se rule preventing First Amendment protection for
speech in the most routine job functions. 146 Overall, then, the major-
ity of circuits have expressly or impliedly rejected a per se rule."6
D. Policy Reasons for Rejecting the Per Se Rule
The Ceballos court and others opposed to a per se rule raise two
policy objections. 147 First, a per se rule would provide diminished pro-
tection for the whistleblower."6 Second, a per se rule would chill valu-
able speech. 146
The first policy objection to a per se rule is that such a rule would
adversely affect the status of the whistleblower. 16° Discouraging public
employees from unveiling scandal, corruption, or illegal acts within
the government defies reason, according to the Ceballos court, be-
cause such matters are always of great public concern.t 5 t In particular,
the court reasoned that under the per se rule formulation, which dis-
tinguishes between speech by employees acting as citizens and speech
by employees acting as employees, protecting only speech by citizens
would encourage public employees to speak to the media or other
indirect sources to seek redress—an indirect approach to resolution—
instead of reporting the improper doings to superiors. 162 The Ceballos
court also noted that the Connick ruling draws no distinction between
internal and external speech when determining whether public em-
143 Id.; see also Gonzalez, 239 F.3d at 941. Only the most rote tasks that were of little pub-
lic concern did not receive First Amendment protection after Delgado. 282 F.3d at 519.
144 Delgado, 282 F.3d at 519 (distinguishing Gonzalez).
145 Id,
I" Sec Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 598-99; Baldassare, 250 F.3d at 196-97; Lewis, 165 F.3d at 164;
Dill, 155 F.3d at 1202-03; Fikes, 79 F.3d at 1084. The First and Eighth Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals have not addressed the issue sufficiently to discern their stance on the legality of a
per se rule. See generally Schilcher v. Univ. of Ark., 387 F.3d 959 (8th Cir. 2004); Rivera-
Jiminez v. Pierluisi, 362 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2004).
147 See Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1176; Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 439 (Murnaghandi., dissenting).
148 See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
149 See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
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ployee speech touches on matters of public concern.'" Therefore,
articulating a test that encourages external whistleblowing and dis-
courages internal whistleblowing adds a distinction to public em-
ployee speech unacknowledged by the Supreme Court.'" Further-
more, the court reasoned, whistleblower statutes provide only some
protection for government employees who reveal wrongdoing. 155 Al-
though such statutes often allow for whistleblowing against the gov-
ernment, the First Amendment can more affirmatively protect what
its very language commands: freedom from the suppression of the
ability to seek redress from that government. 156
Finally, those opposing the per se rule reason that adopting such
a rule will produce a general chilling effect on speech.'" This ration-
ale reflects the policy consideration that because public employees
generally have insight into the functioning of government, their
speech is inherently valuable.' 58 Together with concerns about protec-
tion for whistleblowers, then, the potential chilling effect on speech
discourages the adoption of a per se rule. 159
IV. ANALYSIS: THE PER SE RULE WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE
PURPOSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In addition to the previously discussed criticisms of the proposed
per se rule precluding free speech protection for public employees
performing regular job duties, courts must reject the rule because it is
contrary to the purposes of the First Amendment. 160 First, a per se
rule could pose practical difficulties for professors in public universi-
ties and limit academic inquiry. 161 Furthermore, a per se rule could




155 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,674 (1996).
156 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1174.
157 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 439 (Murnaghand., dissenting).
155 See id.
159 See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
155 See infra notes 164-212 and accompanying text.
151 See Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401,439 (4th Cir. 2000) (Murnaghan, J., dissent-
ing); see also info notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
152 See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 542; see also infra notes 185-212 and accompanying
text. Content discrimination is the practice of forbidding speech because it addresses a
certain topic. Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 540. Content discrimination can lead to view-
point discrimination, which is the practice of forbidding speech that takes a standpoint
disfavored by the suppressor of the speech. Id. at 542.
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Additionally, the justifications for the per se rule are contrary to exist-
ing First Amendment caselaw.ms
A. The Issue of Speech in Public Universities
A per se rule is contrary to the purposes of the First Amendment
because it would negatively affect academic inquiry in public universi-
ties.'" Professors at public educational institutions are employees of
the state and as such would be subject to a per se rule adopted by
courts.' 55 Allowing the per se rule in this context is problematic for
two reasons. 166 Professors often speak both as citizens and as employ-
ees, rendering it difficult as a practical matter to determine the role in
which the professor speaks in a particular instance. 167 Additionally,
allowing such a rule could impede academic freedom. 168
Adopting the per se rule would create practical difficulties for
courts, which would be forced to determine whether a professor
spoke as an employee or as a citizen in an academic context. 169 The
per se rule adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Urofsky v. Gilmore requires
such a determination before a court can inquire into whether the sub-
ject of the speech involved matters of public concern.'" So, under the
per se rule, courts must determine in which role, citizen or employee,
a professor speaks in deciding if his or her speech is constitutionally
protected."' This determination is practically difficult because profes-
sors frequently publish articles and books, some in the name of their
respective public employers and some not. 172 They often make pres-
entations at different events, participate in speaking engagements,
and have scholarly discussions with colleagues.'" Often it is difficult
to classify the role in which a professor speaks and whether the topic
is of personal or employment interest. 174 Moreover, if courts deter-
mine that all these activities occur within the professor's role as an
employee, all such activities would lose free speech protection under
las See infra notes 213-45 and accompanying text.
1 " See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 439 (Murnaghand., dissenting).
165 Sec id. at 438-39.
166 See infra notes 169-84 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
168 See infra notes 177-84 and accompanying text.
169 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,147 (1983).
176 See 216 F.3d at 420.
171
 Sec id.
172 See id. at 439 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
175 Sec id..
174 See id. at 420 (majority opinion).
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the per se rule. 175 Thus, it is practically difficult to apply the per se
rule in the academic environment. 176
Besides such practical difficulties, a per se rule affecting public
school professors could impede academic freedom. 177 The Supreme
Court recognizes that academic freedom is a special concern of the
First Amendment. 178 Professors and others involved in academia are
often a large source of intellectual discourse because they frequently
comment upon and criticize various governmental operations.'" If a
per se rule is adopted, a professor's scholarly discourse could lead to
retaliatory action, with no First Amendment recourse, should a profes-
sor's superior disagree with the professor's scholarship. 180 For example,
under the per se rule, an economics professor would lack First
Amendment protection in publishing an article criticizing current U.S.
fiscal policy.' 8' Such a potential result counsels against the adoption of
the per se rule because public university professors have unique knowl-
edge of their areas of specialization and can contribute significantly to
the debate in their fields. 182 If courts adopt the per se rule, open debate
on scholarly topics could diminish for fear of reprisa1. 183 The per se
rule would thus eradicate free speech protections in one of the places
where it is most important to protect them—public universities. 184
B. The Risk of Content and Viewpoint Disaimination
In addition to the risk of impeding academic freedom, the per se
rule should be rejected because it increases the risk of impermissible
viewpoint discrimination, which is the practice of forbidding speech
because it expresses a standpoint disfavored by the suppressor of the
speech. 185 Whenever speech is restricted, the restriction constitutes
some form of content discrimination because it disallows a certain
173
 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 420.
176 See supra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
177 Sec infra notes 178-84 and accompanying text.
178 See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,603 (1967) (holding unconstitutional
a requirement that university faculty certify that they were not members of the Communist
Party and recognizing a commitment to protect academic freedom).
179 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 439 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
1811 See id.
181 See id.
1 e4 See id.
' 83 See id.
164 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 439 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
las See Rosenthal, supra note 16, at 542.
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category of speech.'" For example, forbidding employees from en-
gaging in sexual harassment in the workplace might be an acceptable
form of content discrimination. 187 Given that the Supreme Court in
Pickering v. Board of Education held that a public employee receives free
speech protection only if the employee's interest in the speech out-
weighs the employer's interest in promoting efficiency, content dis-
crimination is permissible under Pickering if used to promote work-
place efficiency.'"
Although some forms of content discrimination can be permissi-
ble, dangers of viewpoint discrimination can arise.'" For example, a
government employer might permissibly forbid political conversa-
tions during departmental meetings for the sake of efficiency—a re-
striction that constitutes content discrimination.'" If the employer
forbids only conversations about the Democratic Party, however, such
a restriction constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 191 Viewpoint dis-
crimination is dangerous because it can be used to perpetuate the
domination of majority views and suppress valuable speech. 192
The adoption of the per se rule would increase the risk of imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination in governmental workplaces.'" A
proponent of the per se rule might argue that by precluding speech
rights for employees performing work tasks, only permissible content
discrimination exists concerning topics unrelated to assigned work.'"
This justification is grounded in the Pickering concern of ensuring that
government employers have latitude to manage and promote
efficiency. 195 Such an argument is misguided, however, because most
likely the adoption of a per se rule would deter only some public em-
ployees from criticizing workplace operations or engaging in other
speech, and many public employees would still speak freely despite
their lack of First Amendment protection.'" Instead, a per se rule
188 See id.
' 87 Sec id.
188 See 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).




193 See infra notes 194-212 and accompanying text.
194 Sec Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. For example, a public employer might hypothetically
argue that it is mere content discrimination to punish employees who mention politics
within work assignments, grounding its argument for permissibility in the employer's right
under Pickering to promote workplace efficiency. See id.
198 See id.
198 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 439 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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would allow government employers simply to suppress the viewpoints
they disfavor by arbitrarily reprimanding employees for speech with
which the employers disagree. 197 Government employers could engage
in this type of viewpoint discrimination without fear of repercussion
under the per se rule because such a rule leaves public employees with
no recourse in courts. 198 Pickering authorizes government employers to
regulate workplace efficiency, but the Supreme Court does not provide
a license to do so by punishing only disagreeable ideas. 199
An increased risk of viewpoint discrimination within governmen-
tal workplaces is problematic because governmental interference
within the political and moral realms could result. 20° If government
employers can suppress speech that individual managers deem unfa-
vorable, issues regarding the type of speech suppressed could arise. 201
Of course, concern arises that whistleblowing or other speech alleging
mismanagement would be suppressed. 202 Additionally, the danger ex-
ists that government employers would encourage certain political
affiliations. 203 Such a danger is real; for example, in Connick a Myers,
the plaintiff received a reprimand for distributing a questionnaire ask-
ing other employees if pressure to conform to certain political views
existed within the government workplace. 204 Moreover, the danger
exists that certain majority views on moral or controversial issues
would be encouraged through the suppression 'of minority opin-
ions.206 For example, government employers could allow speech in a
law enforcement office recommending or supporting the death pen-
alty and could reprimand workers who take a contrary view. 2°6
Exceptional dangers to free speech arise where government em-
ployers are able to suppress minority views through reprimand but
can allow speech on viewpoints with which they agree. 207 In its virtual
endorsement of the per se rule, the Urofsky court reasoned that
speech .rights should not protect public employees carrying out em-




199 See 391 U.S. at 568.
299 See id.
201 See id.
292 See infra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
"s See Connick, 461 U.S. 138 at 142.
204 Sec id.
20' See Rosenthal, sufrra note 16, at 542.
206 See id.
207 Sec id.
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official state view. 208 In practice, however, if employers can allow only
speech they deem favorable without fear of First Amendment claims
due to the per se rule, creating an official state view on certain issues
becomes easier. 209 One viewpoint could easily predominate in a gov-
ernment office if the decisionmakers in that office punish those who
engage in deviating speech—a result that essentially itself creates an
"official" view. 210 An official or quasi-official state view on any political
or moral issue is contrary to the purpose of the First Amendment. 211
For all of these reasons, the per se rule could result in impermissible
viewpoint discrimination. 212
C. The Lack of justification for a Per Se Rule
In addition to impeding academic freedom and allowing imper-
missible viewpoint discrimination, policy considerations cited by the
Urofsky court and those endorsing the per se rule logically fail as
wel1. 218 They contend that courts should adopt the rule for three ma-
jor reasons. 214 First, public employees speak for the state. 215 Second,
speech rights would be inconsistent with whistleblower statutes. 21 ° Fi-
nally, the rule would constitutionalize performance of everyday work
duties. 217 Each of these arguments misconstrues the Connick public
concern test and the Pickeringbalancing test. 218
The Urofsky view rests on the idea that public employees should
not have free speech protection in carrying out employment duties
because in fulfilling these duties, employees are speaking for the
state. 219 This position, however, ignores the factors that the U.S. Su-
preme Court articulated for performing the Connick public concern
test. 220 Under Cowlick, in determining whether employee speech
touches on matters of public concern, courts 'must analyze the "con-
206 Sc€216 F.3d at 408 n.6.
299 Sec id.
219 Sec id. at 407-08.
211 See Rosen thal, supra note 16, at 542.
212 Sce supra notes 185-211 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 214-45 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 93-105 and accompanying text.
219 See infra notes 219-25 and accompanying text.
216 See infra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
217 See infra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
218 Sec infra notes 219-45 and accompanying text.
219 Sec Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168,1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (O'Scannlain, J., spe-
cially concurring), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (2005); Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 408 n.6.
229 See 461 U.S. at 147-48.
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tent, form, and context" of the allegedly protected speech. 22i The
purpose of these factors is to provide courts with criteria for determin-
ing as a matter of law what speech addressed matters of public con-
cern.222
 The premise of a multi-factored test is that in the public em-
ployment context, the entire set of circumstances dictates whether or
not speech is worthy of constitutional protection. 223 For example, al-
though an Internal Revenue Service employee speaking to the public
about new tax policies might be a representative of the state while
carrying out that employment task, a public university professor draft-
ing a scholarly article criticizing new tax policies probably represents
his or her own views and does not represent the state even though the
professor is performing regular employment duties. 224 Because the
Connick Court recognized that factual circumstances differ in public
employee free speech cases, it also implicitly acknowledged that an
employee can speak as a citizen and as an employee at the same time,
not only as one or the other. 225
In addition to misconstruing Connick by reasoning that public
employees necessarily speak on behalf of the state while performing
job tasks, supporters of the Urofsky view also fail in arguing that afford-
ing free speech rights to public employees performing job tasks is in-
consistent with whistleblower statutes. 226 This position fails on two
counts because whistleblower statutes provide mainly procedural pro-
tections, and some valuable speech does not constitute whistleblowing
and thus is not covered by whistleblower statutes. 227
Whistleblower statutes do not exist because public employees
lack free speech protection to report wrongdoing, as supporters of
the per se rule might suggest. 228 Instead, in Waters v. Churchill, the Su-
preme Court clarified that absent a strong showing of workplace dis-
ruption, most employee speech receives First Amendment protection,
especially because public employees are often in a unique position to







223 See 461 U.S. at 147-48.
229
	 Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1192 (O'Scannlain, J., specially concurring). Proponents of
the per se rule reason that if the First Amendment protected employees in these circum-
stances, no need for whistleblower statutes would exist. See id.
222 See infra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
229 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1996).
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viewpoint. 229 Legislatures may choose to provide supplemental protec-
tions in whistleblower statutes out of respect for the values underlying
the First Amendment and to prevent adverse employment actions
taken against public employees who exercise speech rights. 230 Whis-
tleblower statutes do not create a new right to speak about govern-
mental wrongdoing; rather, they provide employees who exercised
their right with additional guarantees against the consequences of
doing so.23 i The result is procedural protection, not the creation of a
new free speech right that did not previously exist. 252
Additionally, the per se rule could thwart constitutional protection
for speech that does not constitute whistleblowing but still engenders
valuable discourse, although it is part of the public employee's job du-
ties. 233 For example, although a police officer reporting that another
officer used excessive force on an arrestee might constitute whistle-
blowing, a police officer writing a report giving the number of instances
of officers shooting arrestees and suggesting the number is high might
not constitute whistleblowing because it is not necessarily unveiling
wrongdoing. 254 Nonetheless, such speech, which possesses the potential
to improve governmental operations, should receive First Amendment
protection even if the speech does not blow the whistle on wrongdo-
ing.235 Overall, the mere existence of whistleblowing statutes does not
negate the need for First Amendment protection for public employees
carrying out job duties.236
In addition to failing in the position that whistleblower statutes
demonstrate the needlessness of First Amendment protection for
public employees performing job tasks, the Urofsky court and those
supporting its virtual adoption of the per se rule also fail in conclud-
ing that providing constitutional protection will constitutionalize eve-
ryday work duties. 237 This argument attempts to substitute an absolute
abolition on fundamental free speech rights where the Picketing test
already allows leniency for government employers to control speech
while still providing First Amendment protection. 239 Supporters of the
222 See id.
250 See id.




5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (8) (A) (2000).
254 Sec id.
255 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 674.
256 See supra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
252 See 216 F.3d at 408.
296 See 391 U.S. at 568.
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per se rule assume that by allowing constitutional protection for some
employee speech contained in work tasks, free speech issues will per-
vade government workplaces. 239 The Supreme Court clearly acknowl-
edges, however, that government employers must enjoy great defer-
ence in managing operations, such as in forbidding the use of
offensive language. 240 For this very reason, the Pickering test balances
the government interest in workplace efficiency against the speech
interests of public employees. 241
Thus, it is nonsensical to distinguish, as the Urofsky court does by
adopting the per se rule, between public employees speaking as citi-
zens and those speaking as employees, in an attempt to preserve em-
ployer power to regulate speech because such power already exists in
the Pickering balancing test. 242 Allowing free speech protection for
public employees performing regular job duties will not constitution-
alize all work tasks. 243 Instead, the Urofsky viewpoint fails in each of the
three rationales offered to justify the adoption of the per se rule. 2"
These arguments misconstrue the proper application of the Pickering
balancing test and the Connick public concern test; therefore, courts
should reject the per se rule when analyzing public employee speech
under the First Arnendment. 245
CONCLUSION
Adopting a per se rule precluding free speech rights for public
employees performing regular job duties would be contrary to the
purposes of the First Amendment. The rule would infringe upon aca-
demic freedom because professors at public universities engage in
academic discourse as a regular employment responsibility. Moreover,
such a rule increases the risk of viewpoint discrimination because it
allows employers to punish only speech they find personally unfavor-
able and leaves employees with no cause of action when reprimanded
for their speech. Additionally, no logical justification for the per se
rule exists. Public employees do not always speak on behalf of the
state when carrying out job tasks, and whether speech is protected is
determined through the circumstance-based inquiry in Connick. \Allis-
219 See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 408.
24° Waters, 511 U.S. at 672.





244 See supra notes 213-43 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 213-43 and accompanying text.
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tleblower statutes merely supplement existing rights; they do not ren-
der these rights ineffectual. Moreover, employer interests in suppress-
ing disruptive speech are weighed in the Pickering balancing test,
quelling concerns that speech rights constitutionalize everyday job
tasks. Because of the lack of justification for a per se rule precluding
free speech rights for public employees performing regular job du-
ties, courts must reject the adoption of the per se rule.
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